Published December 1999
by Univ of Iceland Pr .
Written in English
|Contributions||Ragnar Arnason (Editor), Hannes H. Gissurarson (Editor)|
|The Physical Object|
|Number of Pages||488|
Request PDF | On , R. Quentin Grafton and others published Individual transferable quotas: theory and practice | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate. Individual Transferable Quotas in Theory and Practice: Papers Exploring and Ragnar Arnason, Hannes H. Gissurarson Visualização de trechos - Termos e frases comuns. Regulation: Development of economic theory on fisheries regulation, Anthony Scott; Economic and social implications of the main policy alternatives for controlling fishing effort, J.A. Crutchfield; Towards a predictive model for the economic regulation of commercial fisheries, Colin W. Clark; Individual transferable quotas: theory and practice. Acheson, J.M., and R.S. Steneck, The role of management in the renewal of the Maine lobster industry. Pp. in G. Pálsson and G. Pétursdóttir (eds.), Social Implications of Quota Systems in Fisheries. Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen.
Individual transferable quotas (ITQ) are an example of catch shares where the shares are transferable; shareholders have the freedom to buy, sell, and lease quota shares. Since the economic value of quota shares increases when fish stocks are well managed, ITQ shares create an economic incentive for stewardship [15,16].Author: Edward J. Garrity. Catch share is a fishery management system that allocates a secure privilege to harvest a specific area or percentage of a fishery's total catch to individuals, communities, or associations. Examples of catch shares are individual transferable quota (ITQs), individual fishing quota (IFQs), territorial use rights for fishing (TURFs), limited access privileges (LAPs), sectors (also known as. Eythorsson, E. () ‘Theory and Practice of ITQs in Iceland’, Marine Policy, May. Google Scholar Geen, G. and Nayar, M. () ‘Individual Transferable Quotas in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fishery: An Economic Appraisal’, Marine Resource Economics, 5: –Cited by: 1. Development of economic theory on fisheries regulation / Anthony Scott --Economic and social implications of the main policy alternatives for controlling fishing effort / J.A. Crutchfield --Towards a predictive model for the economic regulation of commercial fisheries / Colin W. Clark --Individual transferable quotas: theory and practice / R.
In , responding to international legislation that requires sustainable fishery management, the Australian Fishery Management Authority (AFMA) implemented an individual transferable quota (ITQ) management system to address the environmental crisis in the South East Fishery. Defining sustainability in its broadest context to include social as well as economic and ecological dimensions, this Cited by: This chapter explores the relationship between small-scale fisheries and market-based governance systems such as individual transferable quotas. The analysis is prompted by the wide-ranging introduction of private and transferable Vessel Quota Shares in the Danish demersal fisheries. The chapter documents both quantitative and qualitative Cited by: 9. AbstractPrices of fish quotas in Norway are not reported specifically, but can be estimated from the cost and earnings studies of the Directorate of Fisheries. Two methods of estimation are used: (1) increase in book value of fishing rights, and (2) annual amortization of quotas multiplied by their time of validity. It is found that the price of quotas, in most cases, exceeds the profit rate Cited by: 4. Skip to main contentCited by: